Structuring the Phenomenological Field: Reflections on a Daubert Manuscript

by
Karl Schuhmann

I. A Note on Daubert's Life

Even among phenomenologists, the name of the Munich philosopher, Johannes Daubert (1877–1947) is practically forgotten today. Up to now, his life and thought were shrouded in deep darkness. But thanks to Herbert Spiegelberg's efforts to rescue his posthumous papers, it has become possible to publish here for the first time a text written by this highly original and extraordinary personality.

Daubert's presence in the conscious horizon of active phenomenologizing seems to have subsided at a quite early stage: it cannot be traced beyond World War I. Gerda Walther's case may serve as a revealing example for this claim. Although she had studied under the leading Munich phenomenologist Alexander Pfänder, Daubert's life-long friend, and under Husserl, himself on most cordial terms with Daubert, in her memoirs she apostrophizes him already with regard to her Freiburg years (1917–19) as "the legendary Daubert".[1] And Max Scheler, who in earlier years had participated in discussions with Daubert, in a 1927 manuscript in which he outlines the beginnings of phenomenology in Munich, notes between brackets: "Unknown phenomenologist Daubert".[2]

This evidence of the near-total eclipse of Daubert's name and philosophizing sharply contrasts with the estimate of the inside experts. Herbert Spiegelberg was the first one to point out that Daubert had been "perhaps the most influential member of the Munich circle",[3] and Eberhard Avé-Lallemant assigned to him "a key position of a special kind"[4] in this circle. This view is impressively confirmed by Pfänder himself who, in a manuscript note from 1929 on the origins of the phenomenological movement, puts Daubert's name next to Husserl's as being one of its two fountain-heads.[5] In the same vein a year later, Wilhelm Schapp, who knew Daubert since 1908, stated in retrospect that "in the first decenium of the new century the method of phenomenology had been set forth, in Göttingen and Munich, by Husserl, Daubert, and Pfänder".[6] Indeed already in 1912, Pfänder's Russian student, Arnold Karelitzki, had ac-

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knowledged Daubert's prominent position when, in the *curriculum vitae* appended to his doctoral thesis, he wrote: "I am greatly obliged to all my German teachers, but above all I am deeply indebted to the private scholar Johannes Daubert, to Professor Alexander Pfänder and the *Privatdozent* Dr. Max Scheler".[7] He thus credited Daubert, who held no academic position whatsoever, even before his teacher Pfänder who had supervised his dissertation! Also, five years earlier, one of Lipps' students, Wolf Bohrn, in the preface of his 1907 doctoral thesis, acknowledged that he owed most of his intellectual training "to discussions ..., especially with Johannes Daubert, Alois Fischer, and Moritz Geiger".[8] Therefore, Wilhelm Schapp was doubtlessly right when, as late as 1959, he stated: "A main merit concerning the spreading of phenomenology in Munich belongs to Daubert. It would be worthwhile to write a work on Daubert".[9]

The picture of Daubert's impact during the pre-war period of phenomenology would remain incomplete if no mention were made of his unique relation to Husserl. In early 1902, Daubert, then an unknown 25-jear-old student of the Munich philosopher and psychologist, Theodor Lipps, had come across Husserl's recently published *Logische Untersuchungen*. He studied both volumes intensively and immediately recognized the first-rate importance of its revolutionizing approach. So he went to Göttingen by bicycle to visit Husserl. After hours of discussion, Husserl exclaimed: "Here is someone who has read – and understood my *Logical Investigations!*"[10] Back in Munich, he induced his fellow students (among them Pfänder, Geiger, Reinach and Conrad) to study the book thoroughly, and they alike hailed it as a breakthrough in philosophy congenial to their own efforts. "There was no event surpassing this", Theodor Conrad judged later on.[11] Two years later, the Munich group of phenomenologists had become constituted. So Moritz Geiger was certainly right when, more than two decades later, he stated that Daubert had "contributed" more than anyone else to the becoming known of the *Logical Investigations.*[12] During the Summer term, 1905, Daubert, together with several other members of the Munich group, studied with Husserl. This was the so-called "Munich invasion" of Göttingen. Eventually in August 1905, this encounter between Husserl and Daubert resulted in "the momentous joint summer vacation in Seefeld",[13] during which Husserl, Daubert and Pfänder discussed – partly together with some other Munich participants – a broad range of problems, including perception, the ego, and intersubjectivity.

It seems that sometime around 1906, Daubert definitely abandoned earlier plans to complete his years of study by writing a doctoral dissertation. From that time on, he settled in Munich as a private scholar. He never had felt happy about the idea of publishing books or articles. Nevertheless, he continued to write down his reflections in the strange and unusual variety of shorthand which he seems to have learned at school. Still, it was exclusively through lec-

tures before friends and personal discussions that he exerted his unmistakable influence on the Munich group.

At least one episode of this period should be mentioned, namely his encounter with Brentano during the Summer of 1907. In March of that same year, Husserl had visited his venerated teacher in Florence and had tried to explain to the latter the meaning of his earlier battle against psychologism. But his efforts were in vain: "we didn't reach an understanding", Husserl reported.[14] He therefore pinned his hopes on Daubert and his ability for clear-cut formulation as being a better advocate of his case. Thus when Brentano visited his brother in Munich, in July 1907, the aged and nearly blind philosopher indeed invited Daubert to discuss with him psychologism and categorical intuition.[15] Although they did not reach an agreement either, Daubert still seems to have got on with Brentano considerably better than Husserl had done.

The importance of Daubert's regular discussions with Husserl in Göttingen – on his trips between Munich and his home town, Braunschweig, Daubert used to stay there for at least one full day – cannot be assessed adequately as yet. But it is known that he always was a particularly cherished guest in Husserl's house. When, in 1907, Husserl conceived the idea of founding a phenomenological journal, it was a matter of course to him that first of all he approach Daubert to ask his opinion. In 1912, when this plan finally had materialized, Husserl depended heavily on his friend to contribute an article to the first issue of the new *Jahrbuch*. Daubert complied, but his voluminous manuscripts did not get beyond draft stage, and so he finally decided against publication. A year later, he met with Husserl in Switzerland for two weeks of discussion on the revised version of the famous sixth *Logical Investigation*.

The outbreak of the war put an end to Daubert's philosophical activities – at least temporarily – because he, like most other phenomenologists, volunteered for the army. During four full years, he was worn down by the "steel thunder-storms" (Ernst Jünger) of war. "It has exhausted me almost completely", he reported to Husserl in April 1919. Under these circumstances he lacked the composure to keep up his contacts with Husserl, although the latter ardently yearned for it. When in October 1917, Daubert's friend, August Gallinger, on his way through Freiburg, paid a one-hour visit to Husserl, the "master charged him to tell Daubert that he missed receiving news from him". "Even if you don't feel in a position", Gallinger wrote to Daubert, "to carry on the scientific exchange of views, he yet feels himself personally so close to you that he gladly receives any manifestation of life from you. He always has had so many impulses from you that he misses you painfully, scientifically as well as personally".

After his discharge from the army, Daubert exchanged the pen for the plough. He bought a farm just outside Munich to support his wife and himself. Except for discussions with Pfänder, who spent his vacation on the farm from

time to time, Daubert seemed to have given up all philosophizing. Nevertheless, when around Christmas 1923 he sent a turkey to Husserl and his family, Husserl responded with a detailed letter on his actual work and about their relations in earlier years. He not only affirmed that Daubert had understood him and his philosophical task better than he himself, but he also confessed that originally he had tried to obtain a chair in philosophy in Munich for the very reason that he wanted to work in Daubert's vicinity and together with him. This "turkey letter", as it is called, may be said to be quite a unique piece in Husserl's correspondence because it exhibits his view of Daubert as the only philosopher congenial to him.

Around 1930, Daubert explicitly took up his philosophical activities again, trying to prepare an article for the then forthcoming Pfänder Festschrift. But after having drafted about 150 shorthand manuscript pages, he once more withdrew his promise. After this, he does not seem to have written down any further philosophical reflections. A note in a local newspaper on the occasion of his sixtieth birthday in 1937 simply mentions his sociability with young people and his fondness of motor-cycling. As in the case of Wittgenstein, his fellow villagers apparently had no notion of his philosophical past.

Finally, it should not go unmentioned here that Herbert Spiegelberg, when he was about to leave the Continent in 1936, had a memorable encounter with Husserl. The latter, overworked because of his revision of the first installment of *The Crisis of European Sciences*, bitterly complained about the Munich philosophers whom he suspected of having broken away from true phenomenology. The young scholar got no fair chance for a reply. So at the end of Husserl's philippic, Spiegelberg simply asked: "Could I do you some favor?" "Yes", Husserl replied, "could you please provide me with Daubert's address?" (Daubert had moved to another farm in 1932; Spiegelberg at that time, of course, neither knew nor could come to know his address.) But it is characteristic that even at so late a date Husserl obviously saw in Daubert someone who could interpret his aspirations and ideas to other people, and at the same time function as a faithful touchstone for his own attempts to build up a well-founded philosophy.

Following the eventual initiative taken by Spiegelberg, Daubert's papers were deposited in the Bavarian State Library in 1967.[16] Although they were thus preserved from possible destruction, they remained scientifically inaccessible – even after Dr. Avé-Lallemant had classified them – until I managed to decipher Daubert's shorthand in 1976.[17] In 1979, the State University of Utrecht made the necessary funds available to Dr. Reinhold Smid for the transcription, under my direction, of the file Daubertiana A I 1, entitled *Phänomenologie*, from which stems the Daubert text translated here. While this text may speak for itself, I am solely responsible for the interpretative essay appended to it. It is meant to spell out what, in today's situation, might be the

relevance of a voice that, for more than a half century, had crept into the silent materiality of the letter.

II. The Text of Daubert's Manuscript

Phenomenological and Transcendental Method in Theory of Cognition

Transcendental theory of cognition starts from the contrast between the practical naive view of the world and the one the objects exhibit in our continually progressing cognition. So, things are nothing but representations naively made up for practical needs. Naive conception makes things come into being and pass away (it makes them the subjects of existence and nonexistence). Such things, in the sense of persevering fundaments of all statements on relations and changes, do not indeed exist. Naive man works with such representations because in practice they can most easily be handled (this is Natorp's interpretation of Aristotle in his *Plato*, p. 383). Kant has pronounced the result of the great revolution of the sciences and dethroned Aristotle by stating: Things consist of relations throughout. Among them there are indeed self-sufficient and persevering ones, and only through these a "determined object" is given to us. More pointedly, this statement means: In scientific reflection, the empirical object dissolves into an infinity of relations. Even the points of reference of the relation are never given to us in an absolute way, but must be fixed hypothetically. Only a cognition, deepened step by step, of the relations themselves (especially of the time-relations of events, i.e. of the "laws" of nature in the narrower meaning of this term) leads to an increasing exactness in the fixation of the points of reference.

With this, the thing as the persevering foundation of existence is not primarily given, but stands for the ideal goal of endless task. The inquiry into the true subject of motion, matter (as one calls it), has proven this even more clearly (Natorp, *Plato*, p. 382).

So, the object is the x of the equation in which cognition consists. It is determined through its relation to given quantities alone, and they again can be determined only through their relation to other ones.

Phenomenological reflection upon the thing starts from givenness: the colors, forms, and the unifying relations between them. Thereby it will not simply restate the popular view, but makes comparisons and asks for the legitimacy to bestow on determinate facts it has in mind, these or those determinations. In the answers to these questions about legitimacy, in these demands, a determinate objective world, the world pertaining to the senses as it surrounds us, becomes constituted. This is a totally pure and presuppositionless reflection upon givenness and the phenomena that hover before us and that we are unambiguously aware of in perceiving and thinking.[18]

Transcendental reflection here sees a presupposition it will not take for granted. Already in our data it sees relations to a reflecting subject. By this subject, one could understand 1) the always differing psychic individuals: they indeed do not come into question; 2) the sensuous subject common to all of them; 3) the subject of the *a priori* sensuous forms common to all of them. It now endeavors to eliminate this subject in order to look for the object-in-itself. In this case, it would not object to the question of the object-for-us.

Materially seen now, the question arises: Can we ever get out of such a phenomenological standpoint? Is not even the x an x-for-us? After all, we cannot even think of an "In-itself" unless we are the In-itself. In all thinking the phenomenological standpoint is implied. What sense can it still make now to relate the thing (x) to subjects possessing sensuous perception and the power of intellectual formation? That which is stripped off here from the psychological subject? One relates the thing to its fixed and given properties. This thing may be an x, but the important point is that this x is an x for us and that its meaning, therefore, can be cleared up as that of a bearer of functions.

III. Phenomenology and Phenomenality: An Interpretation

Daubert's manuscript (he dated it later on "about October 1905", i.e., shortly after the Seefeld vacation) apparently consists of two well-distinguished parts: a first one on transcendental (i.e., Neo-Kantian) theory, and a second one on phenomenology. Also, the title ("Phenomenology and Transcendental Method ...") suggests a division of this kind. But close inspection shows that these main parts each fall into two subsections, so that the manuscript performs a sequence of four steps. First, the realism of the natural attitude (of "naive conception", as Daubert has it) is described. Then Daubert moves on to transcendental theory which dissolves the object into an infinity of relations open to subjective exploration. Third, he points out that, according to phenomenological investigation, this subjective activity presupposes a certain pluriformity as well as connection among the original subjective data. The last step then consists of a reflection on the three earlier ones: it shows that in all of them the "phenomenological standpoint" is involved.

This diagnosis can be read in two rather different ways. On the one hand, one may interpret it as a material tripartition. The text then would perform a move from natural via transcendental to phenomenological reflection. The last step, in this case, would not further the material content of the analysis; it only seems to recognize that, since its very beginning, the reflective process took place within the unitary continuum of the phenomenological sphere. What in fact already had been there is eventually brought to explicit consciousness. The way of phenomenology thus apparently moves along the beaten paths of

Hegelianism: it leads from perception through science to a type of consciousness which, in the end, understands its own nature and, by this, becomes self-consciousness. Reflection is by intrinsic necessity driven to higher and higher levels of self-actualization until it finally comes to repose in itself.

Over against this, the text may also be considered as being arranged in a way that merely contrasts the pre-phenomenology attitudes (no matter whether naive or transcendental) and phenomenology proper. This second view would imply a bisection of its structure in the manner already mentioned. Phenomenology is, and remains, opposed to any other conception of the world, because it is the only one to "strip off" the factor of worldliness. By this, its activity of clearing up processes that take place in the life-world moves along in presuppositionless and radical steps. Only in this sphere can the "questions of legitimacy" be both raised and answered, because phenomenology alone is built on a soil that transcends the uncertainties and ambiguities of naturalness into a region of clear and distinct evidences.

What lies behind this embarrassing possibility of a double view on the status of phenomenology? Need one fear an irreparable break between two clashing and mutually exclusive perspectives? What is it about the nature of a reflection which permits this apparent dilemma? How can one, on the one hand, contrast phenomenology and the procedures of the natural sort (the second view) if phenomenology must be said (in accordance with the first view) to exhibit above all a higher and more adequate version of the various types of cognition preceding it? Is it not correct to state that naturalness, after all, is just a stir within the pure sphere of phenomenological life itself (the first view)? But what, then, about the substantial differences prevailing between the several attitudes – differences that can in no way be explained away or be undone (the second view)?

A reflection upon the relation of phenomenology to naturalness inevitably seems to end up in conflicting and, when considered in its totality, contradictory statements. One view sees all cognition implied in phenomenology (and phenomenology wrapped up in it), while the other draws a sharp dividing line between phenomenology and the remaining attitudes which it is meant to explain. But is this dualism indeed irreconcilable? Must one not concede that the mediating as well as the separating view both are *views*? They both, therefore, are results of viewing and offsprings of a subject's interpretation and of its looking at the phenomena it has. This interpreting activity in fact forms the unitary root of the monistic as well as of the pluralistic perspective under which phenomenology appears to itself. In the process of interpretation, the subject appropriates the phenomena and makes them become *its* objects. At the same time, however, it sets off against these havings and differentiates between two opposite poles of intentionality, restricting itself to just one of the two sides. Moreover, both perspectives can be shown to be interdependent and presup-

posing each other. The subject, in their relation, can be understood to enjoy a special asymmetric position only because it is part and parcel of the total phenomenal field. Conversely, the phenomena cannot be said to contain any objective features whatsoever without opposing their objectivity to a subject they have to expel from their own range, i.e., that transcends them. So, neither of the two phenomenological perspectives may be considered to be a last datum. Whenever one of them is focussed upon, its counterpart will irresistibly come to the fore. Both are but basic functions of, and the index of each other in, the original field of interpretation and of the constitution of phenomena. In their interrelationship, they behave by turns as theme and horizon, as text and context. But between elements of this kind "there is equality in interaction", as Herbert Spiegelberg once put it.[19]

The relation between consciousness and its object (= non-consciousness), between self-consciousness and consciousness, and finally between phenomenology and non-phenomenology,[20] is in each of these cases governed by this character of one-sided, internal self-transcendence (the objective side) or intentional reference (the subjective side). The material content of Daubert's own manuscript furnishes what easily might be the most fitting example to illustrate this. Its first part – except for the first phrase which, however, is of crucial importance, as it establishes the framework for all that follows – consists of nothing but an occasionally somewhat free excerpt from three pages of a book on Plato written by the Marburg Neo-Kantian philosopher, Paul Natorp.[21] To Natorp's analysis of the native notion of the given thing, or to the refined concept of an x as "the ideal goal" of research, Daubert opposed a fresh phenomenological description of the "world pertaining to the senses" and of the x as a "bearer of functions". A pre-phenomenological reflection upon the two possible attitudes towards the object is thus superseded by a fuller unfolding of their relatedness to the subject. But on the other hand, Natorp's text is for Daubert more than just a stepping-stone towards his own phenomenological reflection. This is evidenced not only by the ascending line of thought he constructs by deliberately inverting Natorp's original train of thought (Daubert treats Natorp's p. 383 prior to pp. 382 and 384). It is also spelled out in still greater detail by his contention that the "criticistic mode of inquiry" presupposes "phenomenological standpoint" is effectively implied in all thinking, even in the seemingly naive conception of the object. This virtual omnipresence of phenomenology is the deepest reason for the possibility of arriving at the entrance gate of pure phenomenologizing, despite the fact that we must necessarily start from the pre-given fixations permeating our historically conditioned life-world.

It is this power of assimilating even standpoints apparently widely diverging from it that accounts for the superiority of phenomenology over other attitudes. In contrast, transcendental theory set out by opposing the practical

naive view. It remains bound to this opposition, so that it never will overcome disunion and duality. Transcendentalism is doomed to maintain itself by erecting a world of its own, a world behind sense and experience which is shared by no one else. One may express this dichotomy as the antagonism of practical and theoretical directedness, of naive and scientific attitudes, or of the empirical and the transcendental conceptions of things. In all these variations, it instances the general Aristotelian scheme of the difference between the first-for-us and the first-in-itself. According to this scheme (to which even the would-be Platonist, Natorp, stubbornly sticks), the first-for-us, after having served as the starting-point of investigation, is neglected and devalued for the benefit of a higher type of cognition. Accordingly, Neo-Kantian transcendentalism fails to break out of this self-made prison; it misses the necessary power of integration and will not get beyond the negative conclusion that "things, in the sense of persevering fundaments . . . do not exist". With this, it overlooks the importance and exact bearing of its own insight that, in naive life, things as persevering units are "made up for practical needs": they are results, by not origins. Making up (*zurechtmachen*) – Daubert takes this word from Natorp – was also Nietzsche's preferred term for designating the way in which identity and objectivity in things are brought about in practical life in accordance with its strivings and in conformity with the demands of self-preservation. This term indeed points to the derivative status of the notion of a "thing": a tenet uniting Nietzsche and phenomenology. According to both of them, the physical thing results from a successful (mis)interpretation of phenomenal materials. Through it also, the subject orients itself in a world by marking out its own place. This constitutive function of the physical thing in the substantiation of a subject's selfhood explains the failure of naive conception to see the use of regressive inquiry into this very function: it serves no purpose in practical life. The same factor also causes transcendentalism to underestimate the theoretical bearing of this function: because it arises from the sole needs of life, it does not affect an attitude that tries to transcend this realm of immediate preoccupations.

From this it can be concluded that transcendental reflection lacks the capacity to lay bare its own roots in practical life. But that this life haunts even the abstractions of a reflection that is detached from direct, practical orientations, follows from the fact that, in transcendental thought, too, things appear as networks, i.e., as relations between multiplicities and unities. Whereas practical *naïveté* neglects the plurality of aspects in favor of the units and discontinuities it stands in need of, Neo-Kantianism treats these aspects as materials coordinated toward various "points of reference". This thematization of the relational nature of objects curtails, it is true, all claims to identical entities in the hypostatized sense of substances subsisting in themselves. And the superiority of transcendentalism consists precisely in this. But it still tries to align all occur-

ring data by inserting them into regularities possessing the status of laws by which the varieties of givenness are governed. This necessity forms the structural link between practical life and transcendental theory. Although it does not bring into play the strategy of fixation and imagery applied by the "practical naive view" for maintaining itself and its grip on the flux of appearances, it nevertheless succeeds in streamlining them to patterns of referential points. In this way, it recognizes the fundamental instability of phenomenality without depriving itself of the right of rational inquiry into the canvas underlying the manifold of appearances. The limits of such an approach appear as soon as one inquires into the nature of the stabilizing factors for which transcendentalism searches. They surely are no phenomenal entities, but still exist only in relation to them. They enter the scene only via subjective staging and because of a special kind of reflection applied to the phenomena. Their appearance originates in the subject, more precisely in subjective making-appear. Transcendentalism had tried to determine the given terms by cutting them down and by translating them into complex sets of other terms horizontally connected with the points of reference that were first given. Although it thus correctly seized upon the relational and composite character of objects, it got lost in the infinite reiterability of its decompository method. Its "fundamental demand for a definition of each concept", i.e., the inescapability of its procedure of cutting up into small parts, led it astray. It got caught up in the dead end of infinitization, and with this it fell into the impossibility of any effective demarcation whatsoever.

Neo-Kantianism could not reach fixed ends because it had overlooked the first beginning and the source of appearing. A phenomenon, after all, not only presupposes something to appear, but also involve a subject to which it is to present itself. Hermann Lotze already had remarked (in a phrase Daubert was fond of quoting) that one cannot speak of a phenomenon "without adding a third instance. One cannot conceive of it as a radiance breaking out of the depth of being-in-itself; a radiance that would exist even without there being an eye in which it could arise, that spreads over reality and is present and apprehensible for everyone who tries to grasp it, but that also would remain, if nobody knew about it".[22] The structuring and organizing of objective appearances thus depends on the thematizing activity of a subject, and is measured by it. Phenomenological description, being a reflection upon the original situation of the subject, makes it clear that appearing and, with this, unification of appearances, are perfect correlates of subjectivity. They can take place only within the horizon of the subject conditioning them. Phenomenological reduction goes beyond transcendentalism by focussing on the central part the subject plays in achieving unity among fluctuating and shadowy occurrences. This demarcation of temporarily stable cores has aptly been described by Spiegelberg as the making of "incisions in the continua of phenomena".[23]

Being a fixation carried out by a subject, this "precission" (to adopt Peirce's wisely chosen term) remains dependent on it, and it never will fail to point back to this subjective origin. The products of subjective activity therefore seem to hinge, according to Husserl's phenomenological philosophy, on actual consciousness.[24] They just exist until further notice.

This phenomenological philosophy certainly was right in unearthing the vital role of subjectivity in the process of bringing about a world of objects. One has to concede to it that this world's limits, scope, shape, focus and mode of connection are correlates of the presence of a subject. But although Husserl and the early Wittgenstein would agree on this issue,[25] they both leave unanswered the question of the subject's way of making its distinctions. The subject is indeed to be held responsible for delimiting and disconnecting the objective flux. But does this not mean that it functions as an economizing and selective element in a field of percepts? Subjectivity introduces pauses and breaks in the phenomenal field; it is negativity at work. Its precissions result in identifying (or patching up) as well as in differentiating (or disintegrating) the given spots of appearance: "colors, forms and the unifying relations between them". So the subject forms the counterpart of an experience in which, on the one hand, all appearances are attributable to objective occurrences while, on the other, the subject's intermittently turning off the power source it preys upon, permits rational insight and, as Bertrand Russell put it, "the language of causation".[26]

But although the organization of perception may be considered an effect of subjective arrangements carried out in convenient ways, nevertheless this structuring does not spring from zero or from arbitrary decision. The subject passively depends for all contents it may receive on impressions which precede any attempt at configuration. Moreover, the possibilities of structuring are foreshadowed also by impressional constellations allowing for them. In the stream of "hyletic" data, certain pre-structured phenomenal kernels are discernible like centers of gravity attracting and deflecting co-present elements in their vicinity. The received phenomenological metaphor of a continuous stream of phenomena therefore should, in order to make sense, by preference be referred and geared to the Cartesian theory of vortexes rather then to the amorphic chaos of an Aristotelian first "hyle". Qualitative differences and blanks in phenomenality being pre-given, the subject works on them by grooving and notching them, so that its various ways of shaping the appearances may be described as differences in the degree to which it hollows them out. This capacity of constitution is, Husserl's philosophy notwithstanding, in no way comparable to any type of production. On the contrary, it denies to phenomena the chance of ever simply presenting themselves without the involvement of horizons of absence. The appearances, rather, are restricted to the indirectness of re-presentation; their being given to us signifies no more than that

they "hover before us". A subject, with this, is equal to a tendency to deprive phenomena of their weight and their immediacy. It bestows a kind of distance and inaccessibility on them and so surrounds them with some halo of irreality. To this effect, it inserts them into a horizon of time, be it time elapsed or time to come. The full object so combines the two elements of a freshly offered constellation joined to the remembering of earlier achievements on like materials. Perception is thus describable as an outcome of this inextricable interwovenness of givenness and subjective coloring. This fact, by the way, might be the reason why the limit concept of "pure" data, unaffected by and prior to any subjective carving on them, cannot be applied to experience.

The presence of data and a horizon of transmitted pre-structures together form the legitimating grounds from which a "world pertaining to the senses" springs up. Present givenness and past experiences about handling them differ, however, only as to the point of time at which they appeared, i.e., in their degree of absence and irrelevance. But their dependence on phenomena is of the same sort. So instead of erecting consciousness into some kind of fetish, phenomenological description throws into relief the poverty of a subject's "making up" that lives on the (indirect) availability of a *materia actuosa* (to use Gassendi's untranslatable favorite term), which allows for being consumed and annihilated in this way by a predatory subject.

This constellation finally discloses the nature of the *vinculum substantiale* binding a subject to its world. Both arise from a basic phenomenal field by way of contraction and condensation; they emanate through processes of evaporation and rarefaction taking place within an active matter coexisting in this field. Thanks to this common origin, even the so-called unknown X still "is an x for us", while, on the other hand, the ineradicable difference between the x and the self entails the consequence that "we cannot think of an 'In-itself' except if we are the in-itself" (which of course would come down to not thinking at all). The same idea of a derivative status of the subject in the realm of phenomenality may also be found in Husserl's description of the ego as an "occasional expression", the occurrence of which depends on "factual circumstances" of some phenomenal frame of reference.[27] The play of forces both striking against each other and also interlocked this way in a single system of motion thus at the same time accounts for the variegated multiplicity of objects and for the occurrence of blind spots from which the field may reflect upon itself. Like eyes of storms, such breathers do not by themselves contribute to the ubiquitous change and unrest taking place in phenomenality. But thanks to their transparency they themselves constitute new shades of color in an overall process. With this, they serve as transitional stops on the way to the development of new sorts of phenomena. This structure of interlocking subjective and objective elements paving the way for the coalescence of new appearances will be illustrated best by Herbert Spiegelberg's striking observation: "A reflection

on a smooth surface is not completely dependent on the viewer, but it can occur only in relation to him".[28]

Appendix: Daubert's Text

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Phänomenologische und transzendentale Methode in der Erkenntnistheorie ((m. Bleist.:)) [etwa Oktober ((19))05]

Die *transzendentale Erkenntnistheorie* geht aus von dem Gegensatz des praktischen naiven Weltbildes zu dem Bilde, was die Gegenstände unserer immer fortschreitenden Erkenntnis bieten. So sind die Dinge nichts als eine für den praktischen Bedarf naiv zurechtgemachte Vorstellung. Die naive Vorstellung lässt Dinge entstehen und vergehen (macht sie zu Subjekten der Existenz und der Nichtexistenz). Solche Dinge als beharrende Grundlagen jeder Aussage über Relationen und Veränderungen gibt es in der Tat nicht. Der naive Mensch arbeitet mit solchen Vorstellungen, weil sie sich praktisch am leichtesten handhaben lassen. [Natorps Aristoteles-Interpretation im *Plato*, p. 383.]

Kant hat das Resultat der grossen Revolution der Wissenschaften ausgesprochen und damit Aristoteles entthront durch den Satz: Dinge gestehen ganz und gar aus Verhältnissen, unter denen zwar selbständige und beharrende sind, wodurch uns erst ein "bestimmter Gegenstand" gegeben wird. Verschärft besagt dieser Satz: Der empirische Gegenstand löst sich in der wissenschaftlichen Betrachtung in eine Unendlichkeit von Relationen auf. Auch die Beziehungspunkte der Relationen sind uns nie absolut gegeben, sondern nur hypothetisch ansetzbar. Zur immer genaueren Ansetzung der Termini führt nur die sich schrittweise vertiefende Erkenntnis der Relationen selber (besonders der Zeitrelationen des Geschehens, d.h. die Natur – "gesetze" in engerem Sinn).

Damit ist das Ding als beharrende Existenzgrundlage nicht zuerst gegeben, sondern es bezeichnet das ideele Ziel einer unendlichen Aufgabe. Das hat immer klarer bewiesen die Forschung nach dem wahren Subjekt der Bewegung, der sog. Materie. [Natorp, *Plato*, p. 382.]

So ist der Gegenstand das x der Erkenntnisgleichung, das nur bestimmt wird durch seine Beziehung zu gegebenen Grössen, welche eben wieder nur durch Beziehung zu anderen bestimmt werden können.

Das Ding in der phänomenologischen Betrachtung: [1] Diese geht aus von den Gegebenheiten, den Farben, Formen und Einheitsbeziehungen von ihnen.

Dabei konstatiert sie nicht einfach die Vulgärmeinung, sondern sie vergleicht und fragt nach dem Recht, den bestimmten Tatsachen, die sie im Auge hat, diese oder jene Bestimmungen zuzulegen. In den Antworten auf diese Rechtsfragen in diesen Forderungen konstituiert sich eine bestimmte objektive Welt, die uns umgebende Sinnenwelt. Dieses ist ganz reine voraussetzungslose Betrachtung der Phänomene, die Gegebenheiten, wie sie uns als "bewusste" im Wahrnehmen und Denken eindeutig vorschweben.

1) ((Rb.:)) Im ganzen wird doch eine Unterschiebung der beiden Fragen vorliegen: 1) Was ist ein Ding? 2) Wodurch bestimmen wir es eindeutig? Und das Wesen der kritizistischen Fragestellung könnte dann liegen in der grundsätzlichen Forderung der Definition eines jeden Begriffs. Man glaubt, man könne durch Definition überhaupt etwas klaren, es selber bestimmen und fassen. Das kann man aber immer nur nach Kenntnis der ganzen (("ganzen" V. für "grossen") phänomenologisch klar liegenden Beziehungen, die man zur Definition gebraucht. Die transzendentale Betrachtung sieht hier eine Voraussetzung, die sie nicht machen will. In den Gegebenheiten sieht sie schon Beziehungen zu einem betrachtenden Subjekt. Hierunter könnte man 1) (("1") V. für "einmal")) verstehen die jeweils verschiedenen psychischen Individuen, die kommen in der Tat nicht in Betracht. 2) Das in diesen gemeinsame Sinnensubjekt. 3) Das in ((Ms.: "unter")) diesen gemeinsame Subjekt der apriorischen sinnlichen Formen. Sie bestrebt sich nun, dieses zu eliminieren und nach dem Gegenstand an sich zu fragen. Sie dürfte dann keine Einwände haben gegen die Frage des Gegenstands für uns. Sachlich erhebt sich nun aber die Frage, können wir aus solchem phänomenologischen Standpunkt überhaupt heraus, ist nicht auch das x ein x für uns? Wir können ja eben gar kein "Ansich" denken, wir müssten das Ansich sein. In allem Denken liegt der phänomenologische Standpunkt. Was kann es nun noch für einen Sinn haben, das Ding (x) in Beziehung zu setzen zu sinnlich wahrnehmenden und intellektiv formenden Subjekten? Was man vom Subjekt hier als psychologischem abstreift? Man setzt das Ding zu seinen fest gegebenen Eigenschaften in Beziehung. Dieses Ding mag ein x sein, aber das Wichtige ist, dass dieses x ein x für uns ist und damit sein Sinn fest aufgeklärt werden kann also der eines Funktionsträgers. A I 1/35v ((leer)) A I 1/36 ((36/34 Doppelblatt; darin 35)) A I 1/36r ((leer)) A I 1/36v ((leer))

NOTES

1. *Zum anderen Ufer* (Remagen: Otto Reichl, 1960), p. 211.
2. *Gesammelte Werke*, Vol. 7, ed. Manfred S. Frings (Bern and München: Francke, 1973), p. 328.
3. *The Phenomenological Movement: A Historical Introduction* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1960), I, 218.
4. Eberhard Avé-Lallemant, *Die Nachlässe der Münchener Phänomenologen in der Bayerischen Staatsbibliothek* (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1975), p. 128.
5. This MS is reproduced in Avé-Lallemant, p. 11.
6. *Die neue Wissenschaft vom Recht. Eine phänomenologische Untersuchung* (Berlin: Grünewald: Dr. Walther Rothschild, 1930), p. 182.
7. *Urteil und Anschauung. Ein Beitrag zur Phänomenologie der Erkenntnis* (Parchim: Hermann Freise, 1914), p. 103.
8. *Die künstlerische Darstellung als Problem der Ästhetik* (Hamburg and Leipzig: Leopold Voss, 1907), p. v.
9. "Erinnerungen an Husserl", in H.L. Van Breda, ed., *Edmund Husserl 1859 – 1959* (La Haye: Martinus Nijhoff, 1959), p. 22. Schapp's demand is met here for the first time.
10. This well-confirmed story was already published by Franz G. Schmucker in his 1956 Munich dissertation on *Phänomenologie als Methode der Wesenerkenntnis*, p. 1.
11. *Zur Wesenlehre des psychischen Lebens und Erlebens* (Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1968), p. viii.
12. "Alexander Pfänders methodische Stellung", in the Pfänder Festschrift, *Neue Münchener philosophische Abhandlungen* (Leipzig: A. Barth, 1933), p. 4.
13. Spiegelberg, I, 174. For a detailed report on this event, see my *Husserl über Pfänder* (Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973), pp. 128 – 183.
14. "Erinnerungen an Franz Brentano", in Oskar Kraus, ed., *Franz Brentano* (München: C.H. Beck, 1919), p. 165.
15. Brentano's report on his meeting with "the main protagonist" of phenomenology in Munich (as he apostrophizes Daubert) is contained in a letter to Hugo Bergmann of July 30, 1907, published in *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 7 (1946), p. 96.
16. Avé-Lallemant, p. 128.
17. For a first note on this fact, see my article "Ein Brief Husserls an Theodor Lipps", *Tijdschrift voor Filosofie* 39 (1977), p. 143.
18. Daubert's own footnote at this point is reproduced below at p. 16, n. 1.
19. *Doing Phenomenology. Essays on and in Phenomenology* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973), p. 187.
20. Daubert treated *Urphänomenologie* in a text (MS Daubertiana A I 1/49) which is closely connected with the one published here.
21. *Platos Ideenlehre. Eine Einführung in den Idealismus* (Leipzig: Felix Meiner, 1902), pp. 382–384. It should be noted that Daubert's choice of this work was particularly appropriate, because this book already had been meant by its author to serve a double purpose. On the one hand, it elucidated a purely historical topic, while at the same time it sought to introduce the reader to Natorp's own idealist philosophy.
22. *Mikrokosmus. Ideen zur Naturgeschichte und Geschichte der Menschheit*, 5th edition (Leipzig: S. Hirzel, 1896), I, 179.
23. *Doing Phenomenology*, p. 175.
24. See Edmund Husserl, *Ideen I*, Husserliana III/1 (Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1977), p. 104.
25. See *Tractatus logico-philosophicus*, 5.632 and 5.641.
26. *The Analysis of Matter* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1927), p. 216.
27. See *Logische Untersuchungen*, Vol. II, 1st Investigation, p. 26.
28. *Doing Phenomenology*, p. 73.